"Bayesian probability estimates are not necessary to make choices satisfying Bayes’ rule in elementary situations"
PBN-AR
Instytucja
Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego w Warszawie
Informacje podstawowe
Główny język publikacji
EN
Czasopismo
FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOLOGY
ISSN
1664-1078
EISSN
Wydawca
Frontiers Media
DOI
Rok publikacji
2015
Numer zeszytu
-
Strony od-do
1-14
Numer tomu
6
Identyfikator DOI
Liczba arkuszy
1,44
Słowa kluczowe
EN
Bayes’ rule;
choices;
binary hypothesis;
heuristics;
natural sampling;
ecological rationality;
non-inverse rule
Open access
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Razem z publikacją
Streszczenia
Język
EN
Treść
This paper has two aims. First, we investigate how often people make choices conforming to Bayes’ rule when natural sampling is applied. Second, we show that using Bayes’ rule is not necessary to make choices satisfying Bayes’ rule. Simpler methods, even fallacious heuristics, might prescribe correct choices reasonably often under specific circumstances. We considered elementary situations with binary sets of hypotheses and data. We adopted an ecological approach and prepared two-stage computer tasks resembling natural sampling. Probabilistic relations were inferred from a set of pictures, followed by a choice which was made to maximize the chance of a preferred outcome. Use of Bayes’ rule was deduced indirectly from choices. Study 1 used a stratified sample of N = 60 participants equally distributed with regard to gender and type of education (humanities vs. pure sciences). Choices satisfying Bayes’ rule were dominant. To investigate ways of making choices more directly, we replicated Study 1, adding a task with a verbal report. In Study 2 (N = 76) choices conforming to Bayes’ rule dominated again. However, the verbal reports revealed use of a new, non-inverse rule, which always renders correct choices, but is easier than Bayes’ rule to apply. It does not require inversion of conditions [transforming P(H) and P(D|H) into P(H|D)] when computing chances. Study 3 examined the efficiency of three fallacious heuristics (pre-Bayesian, representativeness, and evidence-only) in producing choices concordant with Bayes’ rule. Computer-simulated scenarios revealed that the heuristics produced correct choices reasonably often under specific base rates and likelihood ratios. Summing up we conclude that natural sampling results in most choices conforming to Bayes’ rule. However, people tend to replace Bayes’ rule with simpler methods, and even use of fallacious heuristics may be satisfactorily efficient.
Cechy publikacji
Zrecenzowana naukowo;
oryginalny artykuł naukowy
Inne
System-identifier
20738
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