"Information use differences in hot and cold risk processing: When does information about probability count in the Columbia Card Task?"
PBN-AR
Instytucja
Akademia Leona Koźmińskiego w Warszawie
Informacje podstawowe
Główny język publikacji
angielski
Czasopismo
FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOLOGY
ISSN
1664-1078
EISSN
Wydawca
DOI
URL
Rok publikacji
2015
Numer zeszytu
1727
Strony od-do
1-11
Numer tomu
6
Identyfikator DOI
Liczba arkuszy
1,37
Autorzy
Słowa kluczowe
EN
Columbia Card Task (CCT)
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)
dual process theory
dynamic risk taking
experience based probability format
information use
Open access
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Creative Commons — Uznanie autorstwa
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Razem z publikacją
Streszczenia
Język
EN
Treść
Objective: This paper aims to provide insight into information processing differences between hot and cold risk taking decision tasks within a single domain. Decision theory defines risky situations using at least three parameters: outcome one (often a gain) with its probability and outcome two (often a loss) with a complementary probability. Although a rational agent should consider all of the parameters, s/he could potentially narrow their focus to only some of them, particularly when explicit Type 2 processes do not have the resources to override implicit Type 1 processes. Here we investigate differences in risky situation parameters' influence on hot and cold decisions. Although previous studies show lower information use in hot than in cold processes, they do not provide decision weight changes and therefore do not explain whether this difference results from worse concentration on each parameter of a risky situation (probability, gain amount, and loss amount) or from ignoring some parameters. Methods: Two studies were conducted, with participants performing the Columbia Card Task (CCT) in either its Cold or Hot version. In the first study, participants also performed the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) to monitor their ability to override Type 1 processing cues (implicit processes) with Type 2 explicit processes. Because hypothesis testing required comparison of the relative importance of risky situation decision weights (gain, loss, probability), we developed a novel way of measuring information use in the CCT by employing a conjoint analysis methodology. Results: Across the two studies, results indicated that in the CCT Cold condition decision makers concentrate on each information type (gain, loss, probability), but in the CCT Hot condition they concentrate mostly on a single parameter: probability of gain/loss. We also show that an individual's CRT score correlates with information use propensity in cold but not hot tasks. Thus, the affective dimension of hot tasks inhibits correct information processing, probably because it is difficult to engage Type 2 processes in such circumstances. Individuals' Type 2 processing abilities (measured by the CRT) assist greater use of information in cold tasks but do not help in hot tasks.
Inne
System-identifier
21199
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