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The author examines the so-called paradox of identity through time. As he argues, the paradox is often elaborated by enumeration of several theses (conditions) which generate a contradiction. According to these conditions, change is paradoxical and even impossible because it seems that objects persist as unchanging, or that every change destroys an object and generates a new one (in the second case there is no change too, since there is no changing object). In the first part of the paper the author discusses Roxanne Marie Kurtz’s version of such a view. Subsequently he analyses typical attempts to resolve the paradox. The third section is devoted to applicability of the relation “=” to the correct formulation of the problem of identity through time. He argues that analytic philosophers too hastily decided that identity through time is a strict logical identity holding between quite mysterious “object before change” and “object after change”. It seems that such a view follows from the unjustified presupposition that logic is prior to ontology, i.e. that logic provides a categorial basis for ontology. Apart from this, the exact ontological status of the states described by expressions “object before change” and “object after change” escape our knowledge. In the fourth section he examines the condition of a-temporal exemplification based on the condition of simple exemplification (predication). He argues that the latter is equivocal because one can distinguish several kinds of dependence (structural, existential, and causal). Some of them do not have to imply the extrinsic character of the properties involved in change.